

Message Text

SECRET

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 02626

EXDIS USCTB

PASS TO DOE

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TAGS: PARM US UK UR

SUBJECT: CTB NEGOTIATIONS: VIEWS OF SOVIET DEPUTY ON
KEY ISSUES

CTB MESSAGE NO.147

1. SUMMARY: DURING INFORMAL CONVERSATION ON FEBRUARY 17,
SOV DEP REP (TIMERBAEV) EXPLAINED AT LENGTH TO US ALT REP
(NEIDLE) SOVIET DEL'S CURRENT THINKING ON SEVERAL KEY
ISSUES -- VERIFICATION, DURATION, AND PNE LINKAGE -- AND
EXPLAINED SOV DEL'S VIEWS ON PRIORITIES. SCHEDULE OF
WORK WAS DISCUSSED, WITH TIMERBAEV SUGGESTING, AND US REP
AGREEING, TO HOLD MEETINGS OF BOTH POLITICAL AND TECHNICAL
WORKING GROUPS EARLY NEXT WEEK, CONTINUING UNTIL FRIDAY,
WHEN MOROKHOV WILL HAVE RETURNED FROM VIENNA IAEA MEETING
AND WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR THE NEXT PLENARY. THROUGHOUT
THE CONVERSATION US REP PUSHED TIMERBAEV ON NEED FOR
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SOVIETS TO MOVE TOWARD US ON DURATION AND PNE LINKAGE
ISSUES IN RESPONSE TO OUR MOVE ON VOLUNTARY OSIS, STRESS-
ING, AS HAD WARNKE IN THE LAST PLENARY AND HEADS OF
DELEGATION MEETINGS, THAT THERE WAS LITTLE HOPE OF SUCCESS
UNTIL SOVIETS MOVED AWAY FROM POSITIONS WHICH THEY KNOW
ARE TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE. DISCUSSION PROVIDED A NUMBER
OF INTERESTING INSIGHTS INTO SOVIET THINKING, WHICH ARE

SUMMARIZED BELOW. BROAD LINES OF PRESENT TACTICAL SITUATION SEEM FAVORABLE TO US EVEN THOUGH IT LOOKS LIKELY THAT A GREAT DEAL OF DIFFICULT WORK LIES AHEAD. END SUMMARY.

2. ON VERIFICATION, THE MAIN PREOCCUPATION OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION IS CLEARLY FINDING OUT EXACTLY HOW OUR PROPOSED ISIS WILL WORK WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION. TIMERBAEV SAID THAT MANY PEOPLE ON HIS DELEGATION SEE NO NEED TO RUSH INTO DISCUSSIONS ON DURATION POSSIBILITIES BECAUSE THEY FEEL THERE IS A GREAT AMOUNT OF MATERIAL YET TO BE PROVIDED BY US DEL ON ISIS, WHICH WOULD THEN HAVE TO BE CLOSELY EXAMINED BY SOVIET EXPERTS. SINCE US ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO ISIS, THERE WERE MANY IN SOVIET DEL WHO FELT THAT LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS DEPENDED AT LEAST AS MUCH ON US READINESS TO PROCEED RAPIDLY IN PROVIDING REQUESTED MATERIAL (E.G. SPECIFICATIONS AND JUSTIFICATIONS) AS IT DID ON SOVIETS MOVING ON DURATION. TIMERBAEV EXPLAINED THAT FOR MILITARY OFFICERS OF HIS DELEGATION, AND OTHERS (READ KGB), THESE ISSUES REGARDING INTERNAL SEISMIC STATIONS WERE OF TREMENDOUS IMPORTANCE, AND THERE WERE LENGTHY ARGUMENTS WITHIN HIS DELEGATION ABOUT ALL ASPECTS OF ISIS

3. ON INITIATION OF ON-SITE INSPECTIONS, TIMERBAEV DID NOT FEEL THIS WAS TOO DIFFICULT AN ISSUE. HE ACKNOWLEDGED
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THAT US DEL WAS SHOWING PRACTICAL AND FLEXIBLE APPROACH IN THE INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS THAT HAD BEEN TAKING PLACE, AND HE BELIEVED IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE IN DUE COURSE FOR LANGUAGE TO BE FOUND WHICH WOULD BE SATISFACTORY TO BOTH SIDES.

4. ON DURATION OF WEAPONS BAN, HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SOVIET DELEGATION WOULD HAVE NEW IDEAS TO PRESENT. HE BELIEVED HOWEVER THAT IT WOULD BE MUCH HARDER TO HANDLE DURATION OF THE PNE MORATORIUM. HE STRESSED THAT EXISTING SOVIET POSITION REQUIRED A PNE MORATORIUM WITH A DEFINITE DURATION, ASKING HOW WE WOULD SOLVE THIS PROBLEM IF WE HAD A WEAPONS BAN OF LONGER DURATION. US REP SAID THAT HE BELIEVED SOVIET DEL UNDERSTOOD COMPLETELY WHY THERE HAD TO BE A WEAPONS BAN WHICH COULD CONTINUE WITHOUT FRENCH AND CHINESE ADHERENCE AND WHY WE WOULD HAVE TO HAVE A TIGHT LINKAGE WITH THE PNE PROTOCOL WITH THE PNE BAN CONTINUING AS LONG AS THE WEAPONS BAN CONTINUED (UNLESS OF COURSE, THERE WAS MUTUAL AGREEMENT ON PROCEDURES ALLOWING FOR CONDUCT OF PNEs). TIMERBAEV INDICATED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD, BUT HE STILL DID NOT SEE HOW WE WERE GOING TO SOLVE THIS PROBLEM. US REP REPEATED POINT, MADE BY

WARNKE IN HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING EARLIER IN DAY,
THAT BEST WAY TO START COULD BE ON DURATION OF WEAPONS
BAN, WHERE IT WAS CLEAR SOV DEL HAD SOME NEW IDEAS. US
REP STATED THAT US BELIEVED IT HAD PROPOSED GOOD
SOLUTIONS TO THESE PROBLEMS, THAT US DEL HAD NO AUTHORITY
TO NEGOTIATE OTHER SOLUTIONS, BUT IF SOV DEL HAD NEW
IDEAS ALONG LINES WE HAD PROPOSED (I.E., TO PROVIDE FOR
STABLE AND DURABLE TREATY WHICH COULD CONTINUE WITHOUT
FRENCH AND CHINESE ADHERENCE), WE WOULD CERTAINLY WELCOME
HEARING THEM.

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5. ON TIMING FOR DISCUSSION OF DURATION, TIMERBAEV WOULD
ONLY AGREE TO GENERAL POINT THAT WORK SHOULD PROCEED ON
ALL FRONTS. HE DID NOT, HOWEVER, TAKE LINE INDICATED
BY MOROKHOV EARLIER IN THE DAY THAT SOVIET DEL WOULD BE
JUSTIFIED IN HOLDING BACK ON DISCUSSION OF DURATION UNTIL
SIGNIFICANTLY LATER IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE SAID HE
WOULD BE TALKING THE PROBLEM OVER FURTHER WITH MOROKHOV
JUST BEFORE LATTER'S DEPARTURE ON SATURDAY FOR IAEA BOARD
MEETING IN VIENNA. TIMERBAEV SPECULATED THAT PERHAPS
THE DURATION ISSUE WOULD HAVE TO AWAIT MOROKHOV'S RETURN
FROM VIENNA NEXT FRIDAY. WHEN US REP REMINDED TIMERBAEV
THAT HE HAD EARLIER SUGGESTED THAT POLITICAL WORKING GROUP
MIGHT BE PLACE WHERE HE COULD SOON INTRODUCE NEW IDEAS,

TIMERBAEV MADE A GLUM FACE, LEAVING IMPRESSION THAT HIS HANDS WERE PRETTY WELL TIED FOR THE MOMENT BY THE LINE MOROKHOV HAD TAKEN EARLIER IN THE DAY AT THE PLENARY. HOWEVER, HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT HE WOULD SEE WHAT HE COULD DO TO HELP NEGOTIATIONS MOVE EXPEDITIOUSLY "ON ALL
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FRONTS".

6. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH IT IS SOMEWHAT FRUSTRATING FOR US TO KNOW THAT SOVIET DEL HAS NEW IDEAS ON DURATION THAT THEY HAVE NOT YET SURFACED, THE OVERALL TACTICAL SITUATION STILL SEEMS TO HAVE CERTAIN FAVORABLE ELEMENTS FOR US. WHAT SOVIETS ARE CLEARLY MOST CONCERNED ABOUT, AND WHAT THEY ARE MOST ANXIOUS FOR FURTHER MATERIAL ON, IS THE SUBJECT OF INTERNAL SEISMIC INSTALLATIONS. THIS, OF COURSE, IS AN AREA WHERE WE HAVE THE PRINCIPAL INTEREST IN MAKING EARLY AND SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS. WE ARE PRESSING THEM TO ACCEPT ON TERRITORY OF THE SOVIET UNION ADVANCED VERIFICATION EQUIPMENT TO PROVIDE CONTINUOUS, AUTHENTICATED DATA. IT THEREFORE BEHOOVES US TO PRESS ON AS PERSISTENTLY AS WE CAN TO SELL OUR IDEAS TO THE SOVIETS ON ISIS, WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE CONCURRENTLY MOVING ON DURATION. THE AREA WHERE WE DID MAKE AN IMPORTANT MOVE TOWARD THE SOVIETS -- PROCEDURE FOR INITIATING VOLUNTARY OSIS -- IS NOT ONE IN WHICH THE SOVIETS ARE PRESSING US UNDULY FOR IMMEDIATE AGREEMENT.

7. IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT THE SOVIET DEL MAY BE EXPERIENCING CONSIDERABLE INTERNAL STRAIN. AT THE HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE PLENARY ON FRIDAY, MOROKHOV MADE THE SURPRISING REMARK THAT HE HAD THE "COURAGE" TO PROPOSE THAT THE DISCUSSION OF OUR PRIORITIES BE SHIFTED FROM THE PLENARY, WHERE NEARLY TWO DOZEN SOVIET DEL MEMBERS ATTEND, TO THE RESTRICTED MEETING OF HEADS OF DELEGATION. TIMERBAEV LATER CONFIRMED TO THE US ALT REP THAT IT WAS VERY DIFFICULT FOR THE SOVIET DEL TO CONDUCT SUCH DISCUSSIONS IN THE PRESENCE OF THEIR ENTIRE DELEGATION. WHAT WE NEED TO KEEP IN MIND IS THAT A LARGE AND HIGHLY COMPETENT SOVIET DELEGATION,
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INCLUDING SCIENTISTS, MILITARY OFFICERS AND INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS, IS NOW DISCUSSING SERIOUSLY WITH US THE POSSIBLE INSTALLATION IN THE SOVIET UNION OF ADVANCED VERIFICATION EQUIPMENT IN A MANNER THAT SOVIET OFFICIALS

PROBABLY NEVER BELIEVED POSSIBLE EVEN A FEW YEARS AGO.
WHILE THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE STILL IN AN EARLY STAGE, THE
TALKS ON ISIS CONTINUE TO PROCEED SERIOUSLY AND
COOPERATIVELY. END COMMENT. WARNKE

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